Introduction
On August 16, 1997 at near 02:ll GMT a seismic event from near the Russian island of Novaya Zemlya was detected at the Prototype Internation Data Center (PIDC). The PIDC used two array stations in Scandinavia (NORES and FINES) and one three-component seismic station in Russia (NRI) to detect the event, and then called up two additional auxiliary arrays (HFS and SPITS) and one three-component station (ARU) to locate the event off the eastern coast of the southern island of Novaya Zemlya beneath the Kara Sea (Figure 1 ). Seismology research organizations in Norway, Finland, and the United States all estimated locations similar to the PIDC location. Table 1 summarizes each organization's location, magnitude, and origin time estimate.
Seismic events from on or near Novaya Zemlya are carefully examined as the north end of the southern island is the Russian nuclear test site (NZTS in Figure 1 ). Furthermore, natural seismic events from this region are known to be rare, at least for events greater than about rnb 4.0. At magnitudes above this level, most events can be detected and located by using teleseismic records (seismic stations over 2500 km from the event). The 16 August event was too small to be detected or otherwise analyzed using teleseismic records. Hence, it was the first unidentified regional seismic event (recorded only at distances of less than about 2500 km) to be detected and located near a known nuclear test site since the United States and Russia signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996. ,In many ways, this event represents what may become the routine CTBT monitoring situation, detecting, locating, and identifying a small seismic event using only regional data.
'
Soon after the event was reported by the PIDC we collected and analyzed current and historic seismic data recorded at stations KEiV in northern Finland and KBS on Spitsbergen (Figure 1 ). We chose these stations because they have been operated for many years as USGS digital seismic stations, and because archived records from these stations are readily available via the Internet from the IRIS Data Management Center (DMC). Our first objective was to confirm that the 16 August event did not occur at or near the test site. Our second objective was to determine if P-to-S amplitude ratios could be used to class the 16 August event as an earthquake or as an explosion.
Focusing efforts on station KEV, we find that S-minus-P arrival times for explosions and for the 16 August event clearly indicate that (relative to KEV) the 16 August event occurred at least 80 km east of the test site. Including S-minus-P arrival times from KBS constrains the location to beneath the Kara Sea and in good agreement with the locations summarized in Table 1 . From an analysis of Pn/Sn waveform ratios at frequencies above 4 Hz, we find that the 16 August event falls within the population of regional earthquakes and is distinctly separated from Novaya Zemlya and other northern Eurasian nuclear explosion populations.
Although the explosions all have magnitudes (mb) above 4.5, and thus can not be directly compared to the smaller earthquakes, we believe that the separation between the two populations is great enough to conclude that the 16 August event is not an explosion source. Thus, given its location and waveform characteristics, we conclude the 16 August event was an earthquake. Below we report details of our study and offer some comments regarding preparation for CTBT monitoring.
S-minus-P Times
As a quick check on location, we compared S-minus-P arrival times for NZTS explosions and the 16 August event. Using observations from a common station, if the S-minus-P time for the 16 August event is different from the S-minus-P times for NZTS explosions, then we can safely conclude that the 16 August event did not occur at or near the test site. We are not estimating an absolute location for the 16 August event, and thus this technique is independent of an assumed velocity model. We make the assumptions that the NZTS explosions did indeed occur at the test site and P velocity is roughly 1.73 times S velocity (Poisson's Ratio is near 0.25).
Unfortunately, finding historic data (waveforms or bulletins) from previous Novaya Zemlya events that can be compared to the 16 August event is difficult. The last known Novaya Zemlya nuclear test occurred on 24 October, 1990 (Ringdal, 1997 . Therefore, we looked for stations that began operation by at least mid-1990 and also recorded the 16 August event. The arrays in southern Norway and Sweden have operated since the 1970's ( Figure 1 ) and recorded the 16 August event. However, these arrays are over 2000 km from NZTS, and at these distances and for magnitudes below about mb 4.0, S is attenuated to background noise levels and can not be picked (Baumgardt, 1993) . The array ARCES in northern Norway has operated since 1987 and has recorded NZTS explosions, but it was not operating on 16 August, 1997. The array SPITS on Spitsbergen Island recorded the 16 August event with clear P,, and S, , arrivals ( Figure 2 ). However, SPITS has operated only since 1992 and has therefore never recorded a known nuclear explosion from NZTS.
Station KEV in northern Finland (Figure 1) (Figure 3 ).
We picked P, and S,, arrivals for both stations (Figure 3 ) and then obtained P, and S, arrival times from International Seismological Centre (ISC) Bulletins for NZTS nuclear explosions from the 1980's and 1990 (Table 2 ). For KEV we also obtained P, and S, times from the ISC Bulletin for the 1 August 1986 Kara Sea earthquake (Marshall, 1986) . Figures 4 and 5, graphical displays of the ISC data in Table 2 , show that, relative to KEV and KBS, Sminus-P times form the 16 August event are about 8 seconds greater than NZTS S-minus-P times. Eight seconds of S-minus-P time corresponds to at least 80 km of distance. Hence, the 16 August event occurred east-southeast of NZTS, well out into the Kara Sea and in agreement with the locations reported in Table 1. For KEV, explosion S-minus-P times from the ISC bulletins range between about 98 and 104 seconds, increasing from the early 1980's through 1990 (Figure 4) . In 1987 KEV was upgraded from a vertical-component, short-period station to a three-component, broadband station. To investigate this rather large range in reported times, we retrieved all available NZTS explosion waveforms for KEV from the IRIS DMC ( Figure 6 ). After correcting all waveforms for instrument response, we picked P, and S,, arrivals for 6 explosions and found a consistent S-minus-P time of near look1 s (Figure 7 ). We picked S, where amplitudes first start to emerge from the decaying P coda, and when horizontal components were available (from 1987 to the present) we picked S,, from transverse records (Figure 8 ). Whoever picked and reported these times to the ISC, apparently read S, on the broadband records where frequencies change to longer periods, about 4 seconds after S, amplitudes begin to increase out of the P coda.
Using the 1990 NZTS explosion, we calibrated S-minus-P time at KEV (100 s) to distance (1046 km). From this calibration information and S-minus-P times from the 16 August event read at KEV (= 108 s) and KBS (2: 131 s), we find that P,, and S, arrival times at these stations are consistent with the location of the 16 August event reported by the PIDC ( Figure  9 ). As described in the Introduction above, the PIDC did not use readings from KEV or KBS to locate the event. Hence, relative to NZTS, and considering the consistency with the PIDC , location, the 16 August event clearly occurred even farther southeast and out into the Kara Sea than the 1 August 1986 earthquake ( Figure 9 ).
Event Identification From Waveforms
The lack of natural seismicity near Novaya Zemlya and the relatively large sizes of historic NZTS explosions (generally above rnb 5.5) make event identification studies for this region difficult. We found that KEV has the most complete publicly available record of digital waveforms of nuclear explosions and earthquakes from northwestern Eurasia and the adjacent Arctic region. The more southern Scandinavian stations have operated for more years than KEV, but for the small earthquakes and explosions (mb <4.0) that are available for analysis, S, is attenuated to background noise levels and can not be measured at distances greater than about 1500 km. We selected nuclear weapon tests from NZTS, Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNE's) from northern Eurasia, earthquakes from northern Eurasia, and earthquakes from northwest and northeast of Novaya Zemlya (Table 3 and Figure 1 ) for discrimination analysis.
We used the USGS PDE catalog and the PIDC REB to select reference events. Most earthquakes are from south and southeast of Spitsbergen as the PIJX has been locating events with magnitudes between 3 and 4 from this region since 1995. We intentionally avoided events that are directly associated with the mid-Atlantic Ridge. Digital records of the 1 August 1986 Novaya Zemlya earthquake (Marshall, 1989) are not available at KEV. Of the three other unidentified events known to have occurred on or near Novaya Zemlya in 1992 Zemlya in , 1995 Zemlya in , and 1996 (Figure 9 ), only the mb 2.4 event of 13 January 1996 was recorded at KFN. The 13 January event did not have signal that exceeded noise levels at KEV, and we did not use it in our study.
Because the available earthquakes are quite small, we did not attempt to measure surface waves and therefore did not do an mb:Ms analysis. Figures 3, 6 , and 8. show that the only prominent phases on the regional seismograms are P, and S,,. Furthermore, for many of the small earthquakes recorded at distances of more than 1000 km, P, and S, do not emerge from background noise until filtering at frequencies above 3 Hz. Hence, our discrimination efforts are focused only on high-frequency (f > 3 Hz) P,/S,, amplitude ratios. Figure 10 shows a panel of various event types used in our analysis that are filtered between 6 and 8 Hz. The nuclear explosions (top two waveforms) are deficient in S, energy relative to the earthquakes and 16 August event.
For each waveform, we picked P, and S, onsets and then measured rms amplitude within time windows determined by the phase onsets, phase window velocities (8.25 -7.7 km s-* for P, and 4.65 -4.3 km s-' for S,, , and event-station distance. We formed P,/S,, ratios in the loglo domain for all events that had P, and S,, amplitudes that were at least twice the pre-event noise level. To account for different attenuation and spreading factors between P, and S,, we estimated a linear fit to the ratio-distance trend using only the earthquake ratios, and then removed the trend from all ratios (earthquakes, explosions, and the 16 August event). After removing the distance trend, we form the corrected ratio-versusmagnitude discrimination plot. We made all measurements on vertical component records after correcting for instrument response. Figures 11 , 12, and 13, show results for the 4-6, 5-7, and 6-8 Hz bands.
Event-station distances range between about 400 and 2100 km for this data set. The ratio-distance trend for all bands is pronounced, and removing the trend increases separation between the explosion and earthquake populations. As frequency increases, separation also increases between the explosion and earthquake population. At 4-6 Hz the 16 August event is at the top of the earthquake population, but it is below the explosion population. Above 5 Hz the 16 August event remains near the top of the earthquake population, and the two populations remain separated.
The discrimination plots indicate that the 16 August event has an earthquake source. The smallest explosion in this data set has an mb of 4.5 and the largest earthquake in the the data set has an mb of 4.5. Thus, the populations just overlap in magnitude. More overlap at low magnitudes would be helpful, but because the explosion ratios do not appear to be decreasing with event size, we do not expect explosions in the mb 3.5 to 4.3 range to overlap with the small earthquakes that we have evaluated. Furthermore, the P,/S, ratio of the 16 August event decreases with increasing frequency (Figures 11, 12, and 13) . If the 16 August event were an explosion, we would expect it's P,/S, ratio to increase with frequency.
Discussion and Conclusions
We have evaluated the location of the 16 August event relative to explosions that are known to have occurred at NZTS using data from GSN stations KEV and KBS. We conclude that the event occurred at least 100 southeast of the test site, beneath the Kara Sea and in good agreement with locations estimated by other organizations. We have also done a discrimination analysis using KEV data, comparing P, /S, ratios of earthquakes, nuclear explosions, and the 16 August event. At frequencies above 4 Hz, the 16 August event falls within the earthquake population and is separated from the explosion population. Taking the location and discrimination results together, we conclude that the 16 August event was an earthquake.
Several important points regarding the monitoring of the CTBT can be drawn from our study. First, for this event, the International Monitoring System (IMS) worked as it is supposed to. The PIDC detected and reliably located the 16 August event just as the International Data Center will be expected to do when it becomes operational. This was especially encouraging given that the event was detected only at regional distances and the array ARCES was not operating. Second, although the event was detected and located, event identification methods that are applicable at regional distances and specifically tuned to this region were not yet in routine use. Given that many small events (mb <4.0) will be examined under the CTBT, and will therefore only be detected at regional distances, there is clearly a need for continued "regionalization" efforts to prepare for treaty monitoring. Third, the modern arrays, which are part of the CTBT International Monitoring System (IMS), played an important role in detection and location of the 16 August, but the long-established stations (such as KEV) are important for event identification and relative location studies, as these stations have recorded test site explosions and other seismic events over the years. Many modern arrays and stations may never record a nuclear explosion. Hence, because events of future interest may be small and recorded at only a few stations, all available data will be called upon to identify events. Therefore, regionalization efforts should include as many stations as possible and not be limited to IMS stations.
The. 16 August event is the fourth seismic event from on or near Novaya Zemlya to be detected, located, and reported by treaty monitoring organizations since 1992, the same year that SPITS began operation (Figures 1 and 9 ). We anticipate that a similar number of earthquakes in the mb 2.5 -3.5 range will be detected and located in this region over the next 5 years. To expand regionalization efforts for Novaya Zemlya, we suggest using the 16 August event as an earthquake to be compared against other recent small seismic events from the area. The August 16 event can be used as an earthquake at SPITS, and the KEV record can be used as an earthquake at ARCES to help confirm these previous small events as earthquakes and begin to build a sample Novaya Zemlya earthquake population as recorded by the ' arrays.
A chemical explosion at NZTS in the rnb 3.7 -4.2 range would be an immense help to the regionalization effort. However, given the weak S,, produced by explosions in this region, and given that S, attenuation is greater than P,, attenutation, a calibration explosion should not be much less than mb 4.0. High-frequency S, from such a small explosion could fall below noise levels and, thus, could not be directly incorporated into discrimination studies for stations KEV, ARCES, SPITS, and KBS.
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